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Situation, Politics and Outlook of the
Latin American Debt Permanent
Secretariat, Latin American Economic
System
[The following document was prepared by SELA's Secretariat for the First Workshop Seminar
Update on the Latin American Parliament SELA, held on July 9, 1997, at SELA's headquarters in
Caracas Venezuela, within the cooperation famework established between both institutions.]
I. The Foreign Debt Situation.
A. THE DEBT VOLUME.
In 1996 the total debt paid by the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries exceed-
ed $600,000 million, that is, $60,000 million more than in 1994 (see Table 1). In truth,
such increase was small compared with 1995 debt volumes, however these already reflected
an increase over 1994 figures. This rise was due mainly to the increase in Mexico's debt
following the 1994 financial crisis and, to a lesser degree, to Argentina's official and Brazil's
private debt. A comparison with debt volumes of 20 years ago reveals that during that
period the volume of the debt increased by 8.8%, making the foreign debt the region's
main financial problem. On the other hand, in the five year period 1990-1994, twenty
Latin American and Caribbean countries paid $174,000 million in interest on the debt.
In 1996 the relation between total interest produced and exports of goods and services
for Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole was 14.5%, which is an improvement over
the 23.5% percentage registered in 1990. However, this is due mostly to the growth in
exports than to a decrease in debt servicing obligations.
B. FOREIGN DEBT STAGES.
An analysis of Latin America's and the Caribbean's long term debt reveals that it has
unfolded along several stages during which the nature of foreign loans changed considerably.
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Table 1. Latin America and the Caribbean: Total external debt paymentsa
(in millions of dollars) and the relation between total interest produced
and exports of goods and services.
1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1 9 9 6 b kwinp




Arpa 5760 27162 49326 62233 79345 89679 96000 21.1
Boliviad 784 2340 3294 3768 4216 4523 4740 17.4
Brazil 20091 64000 105126 123439 148295 1592000 175000 21.6
Chile 4072 11207 20043 18576 21768 21736 215458 6.9
Colombia 3593 6805 14063 17848 21280 23431 26150 13.9
Costa Rica 462 2209 4140 3924 3818 3794 3700 5.3
Cuba ... ... ... ... 9083 9162
Ecuador 585 4167 8111 12222 14589 13934 14700 16.0
El 247 1176 1805 2076 2069 2243 2485 6.0
Salvador'
1"ae ' 277 1053 2536 2487 2160 2107 2050 4.9
Guyana 263 449 1308 1812 2000 2058 ...
Haitid 66 290 600 841 875 901 915 6.1
Honduras 341 1388 3355 4152 3652 3452 3855 1
Mexico' 17014 50700 97800 101900 136500 161100 160000 12.7
Nim, 493 1825 4936 10616 11624 10242 6100 37.7
Panamad ... 2271 3642 3795 3663 3710 5000 ...
Paraguay 207 861 1772 1670 1240 1328 1310 2.2
Peru 3924 9595 13721 19996 29282 22061 28500 25.8
Dominican 398 2173 3720 4499 3924 4001 3950 5.8
Republic
Trinidad & 170 911 1763 2520 2064 1905 1850 ...
Tobago
UmguY 686 1165 3551 4472 4605 4852 5050 17.7
Veneula 3098 29963 31238 36615 35185 38692 36230 7.1
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Source: ECLAC on the basis of official information. Data does not exactly coincide with IMF and World
Bank data due to different coverage and methodology ancludes debt with the 1ME . bpreliminaty figures.
Total figures do not take into account countries on which no information is available. cCovers new estimates
for the period 1991-1995 prepared by the Ministry of Economics. Debt figures cover only public sector's gross
debt stock and some private sector entries and does not include private sector's short term financial debt; nor
such sector's accumulation of assets abroad dForeign public debt. epublic debt includes investment in gov-
ernment securities by non-residents. Private debtfigures for 1991-1993 have been adjusted keeping in mind
the privatization process and the elimination offoreign currency exchange contros. otal debt estimated on
the basis of officialfigures and Figures from internationalfinancial organizations. Up to October.
From 1930 to 1975 Latin America received few international loans. Beginning in 1975
three stages can be detected which are the direct predecessors of the current foreign debt
situation.
The first stage covers from 1975 to 1981 and it was characterized by the oil crisis, the
recycling of petrodollars, the recession in developed countries and, up to the end of 1979,
low international interest rates. As a consequence of this, Latin American countries had
easy access to sizable and inexpensive loans from transnational commercial banks. Such
loans were used differently depending on the country: Brazil, for example, used them to
finance important industrial investments and Argentina financed capital flight Beginning
in 1980, interest rates increased enormously, exchange rates became overvalued in several
countries, and the foreign debt of governments and the private sector grew excessively.
This period ends with Mexico's 1982 crisis. When that country ceased to honor its debt
servicing obligations, the voluntary flow of capital came to an end.
The second stage is that of the "lost decade" and covers 1982 to 1990. Its typical fea-
tures were the change in the United States' monetary policy, world recession, and the dete-
rioration of the terms of trade in Latin America and the Caribbean. It was marked by very
high interest rates and drastic adjustment programs. In several cases banking crisis, deval-.
uation and inflation took place (including hyperinflation in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Nicaragua and Peru). During that period Latin America transferred abroad $220,200 mil-
lion and between 1981 and 1990 the per capita gross national product accumulated fall
was 7.5%.
The third stage began in 1991 and is marked by the renewed flow of capital to Latin
America and the Caribbean. It resulted in a significant increase in the availability of for-
eign currency. In some cases, the overvaluation of local currency and the risks of volatility
created some inconveniences. The low interest rates in the USA, which stimulated the flow
of capital toward "emerging markets" and the trade and financial liberalization, as well as
the privatization process in several Latin American markets, contributed to this process.
The Mexican and Argentine crisis of 1994 and 1995 affected the situation significantly,
however, the net transfer of resources continued, even if with much lower amounts than
those of the previous period (between 1994 and 1996 an average of $13,000 million were
transferred, compared with $29,000 million transferred annually between 1992 and 1993).
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Table 2. Latin America and the Caribbean: Long Term Debt (in millions of dollars).
1980 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Pending 188656 380954 385837 394370 418157 443649 490344 510688
and paid
Lla, 146198 355893 357640 356350 366311 381475 409830 424732
X1111
01111C
Officials 45757 147412 156009 160394 165510 171593 189156 177385
14126 60020 62424 61807 65187 68432 72697 75217
3269 6449 6698 6935 7336 8084 8340 ...
Bilateral 31631 87392 93584 89587 100323 103161 116458 102169
0 21551 42431 35181 46824 48499 51203 51008 1
Privates 100441 208480 201621 195956 200801 209882 220674 247347
Bonds 9599 75976 79129 82798 108890 156447 171699 197200
C"- 77006 102671 97381 95366 76123 39950 34013
Other 13836 29834 25121 18792 15788 13485 14963
Private
Private 42458 25061 28197 38019 51846 62174 80514 85956
Bonds ... 171 1387 7957 22308 30295 34886 44300
... 24890 26810 30062 29538 31880 45628 41656
World 7706 34760 35668 33553 34577 35419 36390 ...
Bank
IDA 427 1117 1317 1475 1646 1900 2186
Source: Banco Mundia, Global Development Finance, 1997 Washington, D.C., 1997.
The third stage effected a change in the main economic agents which today are the institutional
investors (pension finds, insurance agencies, etc.); and high interest rates and the strength of the
external sector determined capital movement. As Table 2 indicates, in the case of public debt
with public security, the financial claims of commercial banks fell abruptly (between 1990 and
1995 these fell from $102,000 million to $34,000 million) and bonds increased from $76,000
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million in 1990 to almost $200,000 million in 1996. Also, during that same period nonguaran-
teed private debt grew at a much higher rate than official debt and in 1996 outstanding amounts
were made up in equal amounts by bonds (previously almost non-existent) and debts to banks.
The changes in the structure of long term debt are dearly evident in Table 3. In both
the public debt and publicly guaranteed debt and the non-guaranteed private debt, bonds
increased strongly and the role of commercial banks decreased considerably.
II. Debt Policies.
A. SELls PLAN.
The problem of foreign debt is one of the issues that determines the global economic
policy of Latin American countries and as such it is one of SELA's constant preoccupations.
During one of the most serious moments of the debt crisis, SELA convened a Regional
Conference on Foreign Debt, held in June 1990 in Caracas, which produced a proposal to
deal with this problem. This proposal stated that, bearing in mind each country's situation,
the nominal value of all mid- and long-term debt principal with commercial, should be
reduced substantially. To this end, the value of the debt in secondary markets, each country's
development objectives and its payment capacity should be taken into account; payment of
overdue debt would receive a similar treatment. As opposed to the numerous proposals
originating from creditor countries, SELA's plan did not envision any conditionality aspect
regarding countries "internal economic policies' Even though the proposal was approved by
the governments participating in the Conference, it was never put into effect.
Table 3. Latin America and the Caribbean: Structure of Long Term Debt,
1980, 1990, 1996.
1980 1990 1996
Pending and Paid 100 100 100
1. Public and with 77.5 93.4 83.2
Official Creditors 24.3 38.7 34.8
Private Creditors 53.2 54.7 48.4
Bonds 5.1 19.9 38.6
Commercial Banks 40.8 27.0 9.8
Other Private Creditors 7.3 7.8
2. Private. Non- 22.5 6.6 16.8
aanmtta ___
Bonds 0 0.4 8.7
Commercial Banks 22.5 6.2 8.1
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1997, Washington, D.C.
alncluded in the "Commercial Banks" heading.
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B. THE BRADY PLAN.
Finally, the Brady Plan was adopted. It was announced in March 1989 and was carried out
through individual agreements between the debtor country and creditor banks. In the agree-
ments signed, creditor banks agreed to reduce or restructure at lower interest rates a developing
country's outstanding debt, as long as that country initiated a macroeconomic adjustment pro-
gram which generally included structural reforms. Banks selected the restructuring modality
from a menu established in the agreement between the debtor government and the creditor
banks. To facilitate its fulfillment, financing for collateral was made available by official or mul-
tilateral sources (IMF, World Bank, IDB and official donors, particularly Japan).
As a result of the Brady Plan the nominal value of the debt with commercial banks
decreased through buybacks (as in the case of Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela) and
discounts, and its weight was reduced with bonds exchanged at their face value and with
discounts on interests (as in the case of Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela). Nevertheless,
in some cases debt increased with the new currency. In brief, in the aforementioned coun-
tries following the Brady Plan, the foreign debt decreased by one-third with regard to the
nominal values (without counting costs), but increased by dose to a quarter if the values
of the bonds in secondary markets are taken as reference.
Presently, the Brady bonds are beginning to be replaced by other discount transac-
tions, without collateral and with high interest rates. These involve interesting operations
for the release of part of the zero coupon bond, due to the discounts that may be obtained,
and to the commissions they originate for participating agents.
Between January and September 1996, Mexico replaced $3,600 million worth of collater-
alized Brady bonds with instruments without collateral and with high interest rates, with an
average 22% discount The difference between the nominal value and market values ($800
million) and the proportional discount of the Brady bonds collateral ($400 million) resulted
in a $1,200 million savings. The two operations-for $2,400 million and for $1,200 million-
have interest rates of 11.5% and 445 basic points over US Treasury rates, respectively.
C. RESTRUCTURING OF THE OFFIcIALz DEBT.
During the last decade, several official debt (negotiated in the Paris Club) restructuring
plans have been devised with a view to ease payments due by low-income and, in some cases,
middle-income countries. This was the mandate of the Toronto (1988), the extended Toronto
(1991) and the Naples (1994) meetings, which dealt with lower income countries. The low-
and middle-income, highly-indebted countries were considered in the Houston meeting
(1990). In September 1996, the Paris Club countries agreed on the Lyon terms according to
which up to 80% of the bilateral debt of poorer indebted countries would be canceled.
D. RECENT NEGOTIATIONS.
During recent years Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and Peru renegotiated their
foreign debt.
In December 1995, Nicaragua bought back 81% of its debt with commercial banks at
8% of its nominal value. In 1996, the Russian Federation canceled 90% of its bilateral debt
in rubles, which amounted to $3,300 million. Likewise, Mexico ($1,000 million) and
Germany canceled their debt
Honduras and Guyana restructured their official debt within the Paris Club, according to
the terms agreed upon in Naples which allowed for a 50 to 67% reduction of their bilateral debt
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In April 1996, Panama restructured $3,900 million of its debt with commercial banks,
including $1,900 million in back interest. A menu of discount bonds or at a par bonds
with reduced interest was established. The United States Treasury 's zero coupon bonds
serve as collateral to at a par and discount bonds.
Peru negotiated its official debt in the Paris Club (July 1996) and with the Russian
Federation (December 1996), as well as its commercial debts. In the negotiations with the
Paris Club, Peru received the treatment granted to highly indebted middle-low income coun-
tries. It restructured payments on $5,000 million, with the totality of amortizations and
interests accrued between April and December 1996,85% accrued in 1997, and 50% or 60%
corresponding to 1998. The Russian federation canceled 84% of the $1,000 million Peru
owed it in due debt and interests. As for the agreement reached with commercial banks, it
restructured payments on $8,000 million, which included $3.8 million in due interests. The
agreement indudes a buy back option for $2,483 million at 38 cents per dollar.
Currently, the HIPC initiative (for highly indebted developing countries) is being
applied. This is based on international support for the reduction to sustainable levels of
the foreign debt. In its application, the initiative envisions that sustainability may be
obtained at three levels. In the first phase, the Paris Club grants a debt restructuring plan
along the terms agreed in Naples (up to 67%6 reductions), the other bilateral and commer-
cial creditors grant a similar treatment and multilateral organizations support the adjust-
ment programs. If this were not enough to insure sustainability, reductions would reach
up to 80% and donors and multilateral institutions would increase their support. The
World Bank established an HIPC Trust Fund and endowed it with $500 million as an ini-
tial contribution to the initiative. The IMF will participate through a special extended
structural adjustment facility. The Paris Club has agreed to go beyond the Naples terms
and offer reductions of up to 80% of the debt The World Bank and the IMF have estimat-
ed that the full implementation of the initiative will represent a $5,500 million debt reduc-
tion. Forty-one countries could benefit from this initiative, and, in principle, four of these
countries are Latin American: Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua.
III. Outlook on the Foreign Debt.
The foreign debt will continue to be one of the main problems of global finances,
economy and politics. However, it is probable that important changes will occur in debt
treatment, if current trends consolidate, or if changes occur in the political decisions of
debtor and creditor countries.
A. THE POLICIES OF CREDITOR COUNTRIES.
Today, creditor countries' and the IMF's policies are more flexible than in the past.
This is perhaps due to four main issues. In the first place, the bulk of the debt is in bonds
and therefore the most important creditors are the bond holders, who are mostly institu-
tional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, trust funds, etc.).
Commercial banks' percentages are decreasing (between 1980 and 1996 their quota fell from
63% to 18%, while bonds increased from 5% to 47%). This change in the nature of the
creditors may have important political consequences. When the debt was with banks, a
generalized default on payments could cause the international financial system to crash.
Today, even though institutional investors are a fundamental part of that system, their hold-
136 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
ings are sufficiently diversified and fluid as to withstand the fall of one title. Another change
is the end of the privatization process in the majority of Latin American countries (with the
exception of Brazil), in which external creditors played an important part The third factor
is the worsening of social conditions following the adjustment programs, which could
become even more serious if countries must allocate a substantial portion of their income
to debt payments. A fourth issue is that for commercial banks foreign debt operations
(such as reconversions, buy backs and advance payments) represent an importance source
of new commissions, given the high amounts they refer to.
The IMF appears to have adopted a more flexible stance, perhaps due to the above men-
tioned factors. It is possible that once adjustment programs are monitored in details and the
ownership of public enterprises becomes private, those processes may not exert much influ-
ence. Causes may weaken or disappear once consequences acquire their own dynamics. The
IMF itself raises the possibility of an "involuntary restructuring" of the foreign debt when the
debt servicing capacity has deteriorated to such an extent that there are few possibilities that
an economic adjustment program with official financing may reinstate financial stability with
a certain speed, even with a drastic compression of domestic absorption and a substantial
devaluation. Countries, then, may resort to an involuntary restructuring of their external
debt. Such restructuring may involve a lengthening of time limits and interest rates reduc-
tions, or debt reduction operations. This process "is necessarily ad hoc and with uncertain
results It foresees a struggle between bond holders and debtor countries: bond holders may
seek compensations on an individual or coordinated basis, by attempting to appropriate
debtors' assets or threatening to break their trade and payments system. However, from the
point of view of debtors, there may be sound economic and political reasons for an involun-
tary restructuring based on economic estimates that foresee greater financial costs in the
future, against a ratio and deep internal economic adjustments.
B. THE POLICIES OF DEBTOR COUNTRIES.
To the extent that debtor countries have access to new loans and several national curren-
cies are overvalued, it is unlikely that countries will adopt questioning measures. The situa-
tion could change if capital flows revert or decrease, as occurred during the second half of
1980 when serious fiscal and external crisis caused significant difficulties in several countries.
In the 1980s, negotiations on the foreign debt were carried out at the bilateral level
Creditors exerted great pressure in order to avoid joint action by debtor countries. In turn,
many debtors believed they were better off negotiating separately. As a result, creditors,
who did join efforts ended up dictating policies.
Debtor countries now face the possibility of improving their negotiating position, either
in multilateral fora or through market prices debt buy-back strategies. Pressure could be
exerted in international fora to obtain better conditions. One possibility would be an exten-
sion to other countries of the Naples or Lyon terms in the Paris Club, and HIP terms with
commercial banks. Moreover, market prices buy-back strategies could be explored, consider-
ing that bonds' prices depend to a great extent on debtor countries' policies.
In summary, the relative importance of the main agents (bondholders and commercial
banks) has changed, the outlook of developed countries and multilateral financial institutions
is different, creditors have dispersed, and international liquidity has increased. A new outlook
exists, therefore, regarding the foreign debt which could allow for new proposals.
